Knowing God:
Reason is necessary but not sufficient. Faith is necessary and sufficient.

Is that right? Maybe reason is not necessary?

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, paragraph 159 states:

"Faith and science: 'Though faith is above reason, there can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth.' 'Consequently, methodical research in all branches of knowledge, provided it is carried out in a truly scientific manner and does not override moral laws, can never conflict with the faith, because the things of the world and the things of faith derive from the same God. The humble and persevering investigator of the secrets of nature is being led, as it were, by the hand of God in spite of himself, for it is God, the conserver of all things, who made them what they are."

Reason is not necessary; a person can be given an experience of God that is not quantifiable in rational terms, or a person can simply receive the faith through the teaching of someone whom they trust (there's a little reason involved here, but not in the sense you mean, I think).

there's a little reason involved here, but not in the sense you mean, I think

I think I mean that those who are mentally disadvantaged are not at a disadvantage when it comes to knowing God?

Also, doesn't reason serve as way to guard against "experiences of God" that are not reasonable?
For instance, seemingly divine revelations from drugs or insanity.

Right on both points.

Cool.

So, if two people claim to have Faith in opposing (unable to coexist) divinities, we can appeal to reason in an attempt to discount one of them?

Yes, indeed we can.

Can't do it with Islam.

They are un-reasonable. Their God is pure will. One prominent muslim scholar (I forget who, maybe it's not even a scholar, but Hadith!), I heavily paraphrase, say that whatever God commanded is good because God commanded it, as such that if God commanded idolatry, it is good and must be observed.

Don't we say the same thing in a different way?

What God commands is necessarily good.
- That is a Catholic teaching.

God could not command something that is evil.
- That is a Catholic teaching.

If those are both true, but we base our idea of good and evil on what God commands, then where is the separation?

I suppose it goes something like this: we are able to understand that lust does not lead to happiness. But, if Allah commanded lust, it would necessarily follow, for Islam, that lust would lead to happiness. We say that the true God would NOT command such a thing. they say their god could and it would be ok...?

No. They are saying that the reason that something is good is because God says it is good. So if God says that raping a 5 years old is good, then it is good.


In Christianity something is good because it's inherently good. And God, whose nature is good, would only command to do what is inherently good.

Paging Euthyphro. Euthyphro on line one, please.

Yes. I'm aware of that for sometime.

My answer kills that dilemma .


PS
It's not a dilemma.

I don't think Will is familiar with it, though--his comment didn't suggest that he is.

If I know anything it is my Plato. I do NOT know the answer to the alleged dilemma.
In other words, Beng, are you not characterizing Islam's notion of piety's as good BECAUSE God says it is... and Catholicism's notion of piety as universally good despite whether or not God says it is (even though we can extrapolate that he would because it is, in fact, good)... ?

In Christianity something is good because it's inherently good. And God, whose nature is good, would only command to do what is inherently good.
- what this says at least one of these to me: 1. we can know good is without God 2. good exists without God.

All God is good but not all good is God.

I don't think that is right so either Beng is wrong (unlikely) or my 2 part extrapolation is wrong (

Your error (and Euthyphro's [it's difficult to guess what Plato and Socrates really thought on the point]) is seeing goodness as something outside of God. God is Goodness; He is not answerable to some external standard, but He also cannot help [so to speak] being good.

He is not answerable to some external standard, but He also cannot help [so to speak] being good.

Right.

In Christianity something is good because it's inherently good. And God, whose nature is good, would only command to do what is inherently good.
- doesn't this make it seem like He is answerable to some external standard? Or at least that there is some other way to know good than through God?

i think this is the key to your question.

God can and does allow evil to occur though for the greater good to come of it, the problem for us though when bad things happen is to question why? When only God knows the final outcome. It gets even more complicated than that with God's active and passive will.

The answer to your question though seems to be that God allows some evil to occur for the greater good to come from it, but in other examples(such as with the infallibility of the Church), he does not allow it to teach false doctrines.

What makes things inherently good then? It's God, isn't it?

Can He make evil things? No.